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The internet’s meteoric rise has provided vast areas of new opportunity and potential sources of 
efficiency for organizations of all sizes. It has however, also transformed the behaviour of the 
criminal element within that society. These new opportunities come saddled with unprecedented 
threats. Ranging from attacks on the system; unauthorised access, denial of service, malware to 
data breaches; that affect the integrity and confidentiality of data as well as child pornography, 
hate speech, cyber bullying, theft, fraud etc. 
This paper’s objective is to come up with a theory for internet regulatory policy. By taking into 
consideration the unique challenges posed to legislation, the different models of laws and 
incorporating the merits of various philosophies. This theory is aimed at guiding the creation of 
effective cyber legislation and guiding any new developments as it is clear that innovations in the 
cyberspace will always outpace the law-making process. Legal provisions should provide 
assurance to users, empowerment to law enforcement agencies and deterrence to criminals. If 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 Introduction  
The Internet has revolutionised the computer and communications world like nothing before. 
Invention of the telegraph, telephone, radio, and computer set the stage for this unprecedented 
integration of capabilities. The Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, a 
mechanism for information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction between 
individuals and their computers without regard for geographic location. It represents one of the 
most successful examples of the benefits of sustained investment and commitment to research and 
development of information infrastructure.1  
A non-physical complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software and 
services over the internet by the means of technology devices and networks hereon referred to as 
the cyberspace has been created.2 The cyberspace is the subject of this paper as it is where all 
interactions both the legitimate and illegitimate takes place. 
The internet’s meteoric rise has provided vast areas of new opportunity and potential sources of 
efficiency for organisations of all sizes. It has however, also transformed the behaviour of the 
criminal element within that society. The Internet’s new opportunities come saddled with 
unprecedented threats. Ranging from attacks on the system; unauthorised access, denial of service, 
malware to data breaches; that affect the integrity and confidentiality of data as well as child 
pornography, hate speech, cyber bullying, theft, fraud etc.3  
The features of the cyberspace that pose a challenge to governance stem from the disintegration of 
traditional sovereignty paradigms and emergence of network sovereignty.4 Legal rules are 
                                                          
1 Internet Society, ‘Brief history of the internet’ http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-
internet/historyhttp://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-
internetinternet/brief-history-internet on 20 January 2017.  
2 Serianu, Rethinking cyber security- An integrated approach: Process, Intelligence and Monitoring, (2014), Kenya 
Cyber Security Report, 9  
3 Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network, ACORN ‘ Attacks on Computer Systems’ 
https://www.acorn.gov.au/learn-about-cybercrime/attacks-computer-systems  20 January 2017.  
4 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’, 913, 917.  
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generally made to govern distinct subject areas for defined territories.5 These substantive areas and 
territorial sovereignty are what which justify the regulatory authority and policymaking for states. 
Criminal law, administrative law belong to the realm of public law, intellectual property rights 
protect certain aspects of information and its economic value. These laws are enforced by the 
relevant regulatory agencies in corresponding territories. The cyberspace is designed so that 
persons from different geographical locations are able to interact under one roof, without the 
physical inhibitions of space and time these interactions range from contract, social media, 
publishing content, ecommerce etc.6 Such interactions touch and sometimes blur various 
substantive areas of the law.   
Cyberspace is driven by the actions of the individual members of human society; it is a powerful 
medium for social change precisely because it empowers individuals, which is why it is used so 
much.7 The exponential rate of evolution in the cyber domain outpaces the speed of legal and 
judicial processes. This can be compared with whack- a –mole8 whereby each new defense strategy 
leads to co-adaptation by a corresponding set of attacks.    
States have faced these threats since the advent of the internet as evidenced by the Morris worm in 
1988.9 The first attempt to formulate regulations specific to computer crimes began at the 
international level with the Convention on Cybercrime by the Council of Europe.10 It seeks to 
address internet and computer crime by harmonising national laws, improving investigative 
                                                          
5 American Banana Company v United Fruit Company (1909) 213US page 347and 357. (Holding that as a general 
rule of construction, any statute is presumed to be intended to operate within the territorial limits of the sovereign).  
6 Johnson D, Post D, ‘Law and borders, the rise of law in Cyberspace’, 1.  
7 Ghanea-Hercock R, ‘Why cyber security is hard’ Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2012),  
8 Whack- a- mole is an arcade game in which players use a mallet to hit toy moles, which appear at random, back 
into their holes.  
9 Radware, ‘Morris Worm’ https://security.radware.com/ddos-knowledge-center/ddospedia/morris-worm/ on 20 
January 2017. The Morris Worm was a self-replicating computer program (worm) written by Robert Tappan Morris, 
a student at Cornell University, and released from MIT on November 2, 1988. It was was a self-replicating computer 
program causing computers to run out of resources and malfunction.  
10 Weber A, ‘The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime’ 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1 (2003), 
428- 430.    
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techniques, and increasing cooperation among nations.11 Subsequent legislations have been 
modelled along the Budapest Convention while some others have marked a departure from it. The 
AU Convention on Cyber security and Data Protection has been criticized particularly because it 
does not explicitly establish a model legal framework which African countries can adopt. The 
Convention merely creates guidelines for African states in the establishment their cyber security 
laws. The language of the draft Convention does not intend these directives to create an explicit 
legal framework for the criminalisation of cybercrime or for cyber security. As such the adoption 
and ratification of the draft Convention by African states will not suffice unless states individually 
establish cyber security laws in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Convention.12 
Unlike the Convention on Cybercrime which upon ratification or accession by member states 
forms binding law.   
Many developing countries are often recommended to implement a conglomeration of existing 
rules and regulations found in other countries especially in European countries and in the United 
States. Developing countries are also recommended to create national Computer Emergency 
Readiness Teams,(CERTs) organizations of cyber security experts to coordinate a nation to 
respond to cyber incidents.13  
This is done without acknowledging that inasmuch as the cybercrime phenomenon is universally 
shared, it manifests itself differently and uniquely in states.14 For example in Kenya data 
exfiltration was ranked as the top cyber security threat in 2015 – this is mainly by top employees 
and cybercriminals, this is followed by social engineering and database breaches. These threats are 
to the integrity and confidentiality of data.15 As a result, the African Union regulation- African  
                                                          
11 Clough J, ‘A World of difference: The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and the challenges of harmonization’ 
40 Monash University Law Review 3 (2014), 700.   
12 Orji Uchenna J, ‘A discourse on the perceived defects of the draft African Union Convention on the Establishment 
of a Credible Legal Framework for Cyber security’ Communications Law, (2012) 2.  
13 Tagert A, ‘Cyber Security Challenges in Developing Nations’ unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Carnegie Mellon 
University Pittsburgh, December 2010, 2.   
14 Tagert A, ‘Cyber Security Challenges in Developing Nations’ unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Carnegie Mellon 
University Pittsburgh, December 2010, 5.  
15 SERIANU, Kenya Cyber security Report 2015, Nairobi, 15.  
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Convention on Cyber security and Data Protection is alive to this reality and this is reflected in its 
provisions targeted to securing the cyberspace for the purposes of development in ecommerce.16 
Whereas in the developed world e-commerce is well established and the threats they face are 
complex and more politically motivated such as the Sony Pictures Attack from North Korea as a 
retaliation for creating a movie depicting the assassination of the North Korea leader, the Bowman 
dam infrastructure attack where Iranian hackers reportedly gained control of this New York Dam’s 
sluice system in 2013.17 More recently the Russian hack and US 2016 elections.18  
This situation is further complicated by different philosophies as regards the regulation of the 
cyberspace. Cyber libertarians believe that states have no authority whatsoever in the cyberspace 
and that it should be left alone to address and resolve any real conflicts that may arise with their 
own means.19 This position is motivated by the misguided belief that the cyberspace is a lawless 
place.20 There is a system of protocols, code and engineering which forms the cyberspace and 
determines what people can do, how they access the system etc. This is further governed by various 
internet bodies, IETF, ICANN IGF etc.   
This paper’s objective is to come up with a theory for internet regulatory policy. By taking into 
consideration the unique challenges posed to legislation, the different models of laws and 
incorporating the merits of various philosophies. This theory is aimed at guiding the creation of 
effective cyber legislation and guiding any new developments as it is clear that innovations in the 
cyberspace will always outpace the law-making process. Legal provisions should provide 
assurance to users, empowerment to law enforcement agencies and deterrence to criminals. If 
neither of these is achieved then the entire undertaking becomes worthless.  
                                                          
16 Preamble, article 2, African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Data Protection.   
17 ‘Riley Walters: Cyber Attacks on US Companies in 2016’ The Heritage Foundation, 2 December 2016 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/12/cyber-attacks-on-us-companies-in-2016 on 9 January 2017.  
18 ‘Jeremy Diamond: Russian hacking and the US election; what you need to know’ CNN, 16 December 2016   
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/12/politics/russian-hack-donald-trump-2016-election/ on 9 January 2017.  
19 Barlow Perry J, A declaration of the independence of cyberspace, Electronic Frontier Foundation.    
20 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in Cyberspace’ 45 Emory Law Journal, (1996), 912.  
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Internet governance, if taken as the investigation of the regulation of all activities that took place 
on (or were significantly affected by) the Internet, then ‘Internet governance’ would be more or 
less equivalent to ‘law and politics’. This approach is too broad and ill-defined to be useful.  
As such it is important to present Internet governance from two perspectives.21 The first is internet 
governance as ordering of whatever technical systems enable the operation of the global network 
of networks as a platform for applications. It is regulation of Internet infrastructure, its current 
operation, and the processes by which it develops and changes over time. This is done by various 
international agencies; IETF, ICANN, ITU, IGF etc.22 This regulation is well established and 
matters most only to network engineers. What matters then is the regulation of human activities 
and behaviour within the cyberspace. As such formulation of any regulatory policies needs to focus 
on the relationship between the technical infrastructure, internet architecture and broad policy 
considerations.23  
1.1 Statement of the Problem  
Enforcing laws in the cyberspace is complicated by the disintegration of traditional sovereignty 
paradigms and emergence of network sovereignty. This brings about issues of jurisdiction, 
investigation and adjudication. The existing legal framework is varied yet the nature of these 
crimes calls for international cooperation. But the cybercrime phenomenon manifests itself 
differently in different states and they have various goals for their countries in the cyberspace and 
applying standard already EU or US cyber laws may not be suitable. Moreover, there exists 
divergent philosophies on how regulation on the cyberspace should be dealt with both of which 
have merit.   
1.2 Justification of the Study  
This study is justified by the combination of problems that face law enforcement in the cyberspace. 
There is a need to develop a comprehensive strategy to guide creation and enforcement of laws 
globally while appreciating that different states and governments encounter different challenges, 
                                                          
21 Solum L, ‘Models of Internet governance’ Social Science Research Network (2008), 50-51.  
22 https://www.ietf.org/ Internet Engineering Taskforce, https://www.icann.org/ Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers, http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx Internet Telecommunication Union, 
http://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/ Internet Governance Forum on 16 December 2016.  
23 Solum L, ‘Models of Internet governance’, 52.  
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have various goals and capacities. This is especially crucial because laws evolve at a much slower 
pace than any innovations in the cyberspace. Having a place to go to for guidance when 
formulating cyber laws is the goal of this study.   
1.3 Statement of Objectives  
This paper’s objective is to come up with a theory for internet regulatory policy. By taking into 
consideration the unique challenges posed to legislation, the different models of laws and 
incorporating the merits of various philosophies. This theory is aimed at guiding the creation of 
effective cyber legislation and guiding any new developments as it is clear that innovations in the 
cyberspace will always outpace the law-making process. Legal provisions should provide 
assurance to users, empowerment to law enforcement agencies and deterrence to criminals. If 
neither of these is achieved then the entire undertaking becomes worthless.  
  
1.4 Research questions  
What is the cyberspace?  
What features of the cyberspace make it difficult to regulate? 
What philosophies underlie/fuel regulation in the cyberspace?  
How legislative power should be exercised?  
Is the cyberspace a lawless place?  
Which bodies ‘govern’ the cyberspace?  
Approaches taken by other states towards cyber regulation  









1.5 Literature review    
Lawrence Lessig, ‘The law of the horse: What cyber law might teach’, Harvard Literature 
Review (1999)  
Lessig contrasts the ‘Law of the horse’ and cyber law an analogy previously used by Judge Frank 
Easterbrook. Easterbrook who posits that there is no more a ‘law of the cyberspace’ than there is 
a ‘law of the Horse’ and that to speak as if there was such a law would muddle rather than clarify. 
He argued that courses in law school should be limited to subjects that illuminate the entire law. 
That the best way to learn the applicable law to specialised endeavours is to study the general rules. 
The law of cyberspace conceived as torts in the cyberspace, contracts in the cyberspace and 
property in the cyberspace was not.   
Lessing however makes a claim that is specific to the cyberspace. This claim illustrates a merit of 
seeing cyber law as its own discipline as regulation in the cyberspace shows something other areas 
would not. He gives an example of zoning speech whereby in the real space porn is zoned from 
kids. Such that whether because of laws (banning the sale of porn to minors) or norms (telling us 
to shun those who sell to minors) or the market (Porn costs money) It is hard not impossible in the 
real space for kids to buy porn.  
 These real-space regulations depend upon certain features in the design of the real space. It is hard 
in the real space to hide the fact that you are a kid because age is a self-authenticating fact. In 
cyberspace age is not self-authenticating. Even if the same laws and norms did apply in the 
cyberspace, and even if the constraints on the market were the same, any effort to zone porn in the 
cyberspace would face a very difficult problem. To a website accepting traffic all requests are 
equal. There is no way for a website to distinguish adults from kids. It is a feature in the cyberspace 
that interferes with the ability to zoning porn. Law faces a choice –whether to change this 
architectural feature or to leave the cyberspace alone and disable this collective goal. If the former 
approach is to be taken, what constraints should there be on the law’s effort to change the 






Lawrence Lessig Code is Law (1999) and Code 2.0 (2006)   
Lessig builds on ideas from ‘The law of the horse’ in his subsequent works in Code is Law 1999 
and its second edition in 2006. He expounds on the architecture of the cyberspace as a function of 
its design – or code. This code can change, either because it evolves in a different way or because 
government or business pushes it to evolve in a particular way. He describes the cyberspace as 
many places. The character of these many places is not identical. They instead differ in ways that 
are fundamental. These differences come, in part, from the differences in the people who populate 
these places. But the demographics alone do not explain the variance. The exchanges and 
interactions of these people form 'virtual communities' that differ from the communities that they 
occupy in real space.  
 The architecture of the Internet equalises people, embodying them with attributes that they may 
or may not have in real space. Features provided by the architecture of cyberspace can enable 
classes of people, who were previously considered disabled in real space. For example, deaf people 
and mute people using computer terminals on the Internet cannot be distinguished from anyone 
else using it. And with Braille hardware and adaptive software, the blind can 'see' too. It's the 
closest thing to a parallel world that I've ever experienced.  He proposes a constitution not to mean 
just a legal text but a way of life—that structures and constrains social and legal power, to the end 
of protecting fundamental values. He uses a metaphor of a constitution as lighthouse—a guide that 
helps anchor fundamental values.  
David Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and borders- The rise of law in the cyberspace’ 
Stanford Law Review (1996)   
David Johnson and David Post discuss how physical borders determine to what extent states can 
exercise their sovereignty and powers. Computer based communications cut across territorial 
borders and limit a state’s capacity to exercise their authority to make laws and enforce them. They 
assert that the cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant 
(online) phenomena and physical location. The rise of the global computer network is destroying 
1) The power of local governments to assert control over online behaviour; 2) the effect of online 
behaviour on individuals or things; 3) the legitimacy of a local sovereigns efforts to regulate global 
phenomena; and 4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which set of rules apply. The 
18 
 
Net thus subverts the system of rulemaking based on borders between physical spaces, at least with 
respect to the claim that cyberspace should naturally be governed by territorially defined rules. 
The rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries throws law in to disarray 
by creating entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject of clear rules that cannot be 
governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign.   
Joel Reidenberg ‘Governing networks and rule-making in the cyberspace’ Emory Law 
Journal (1996)   
Reidenberg begins by stating that the global network environment defies traditional regulatory 
theories and policymaking practices. Most attempts to define new rules for the development of the 
Global Information Infrastructure (GII) rely on disintegrating concepts of territory and sector, 
while ignoring the new network and technological borders that transcend national boundaries. The 
GII creates new models and sources for rules. He suggest that policy leadership requires a fresh 
approach to the governance of global networks. Instead of foundering on old concepts, the GII 
requires a new paradigm for governance that recognises the complexity of networks, builds 
constructive relationships among the various participants (including governments, systems 
operators, information providers, and citizens), and promotes incentives for the attainment of 
various public policy objectives in the private sector.   
  
Philip Weisner, ‘Internet governance, standard setting, and self-regulation’ Northern 
Kentucky Law Review (2001)  
Weisner affirms that the most formidable regulatory regime that has governed the Internet to date 
is the institution of open standards. It has allowed the internet to grow exponentially as a network 
of networks. A series of open protocols, such as the basic protocol that facilitates data transport, 
the Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and others such as HTML, have gained 
wide acceptance enabling millions to use the internet. It is possible because the standards were 
open and endorsed by trusted standard setting committees. This, he asserts, helped drive the 
development of new applications and encouraged the increased usage of the internet. The internet’s 
openness created a virtuous cycle where members of the internet community continued to improve 
upon it basic architecture adding new functionalities that were placed in the public domain thereby 
19 
 
making a more valuable network. It is argued that the shift in the internet from an entirely open 
standards model to one where there are increasing uses of proprietary standards for critical 
functions raises a weighty question for internet governance.  
 As long as the basic standards were in the public domain, the internet’s architecture contained a 
form of self-control that ensured that individuals and developers could easily access critical 
functions. But as the internet moved to accommodate commerce, the incentives for developing 
proprietary applications and the increased difficulty in maintaining a categorical commitment to 
openness were going to be difficult to contain. Consequently the internet community becomes 
difficult to maintain as a ‘commons’ model. Before the internet became big business, private 
standard setting bodies like the IETF could focus on the technical merits of the proposed standard 
without distorting influence of private companies that would benefit depending on the ultimate 
outcome.   
These works altogether exhibit the ideas embodied in this paper. The first being the fact that the 
design of cyberspace regulates behaviour of people and cyber law thus merits an independent 
academic study.24 It is further acknowledged that the architecture which is a function of design is 
not immutable and laws can be used to adjust this space but whether that should be done and how 
it should be done is a difficult and controversial matter. Second the emergence of the GII throws 
law in to disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need to become the subject of clear 
rules that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign. This 
affects the power of localised governments to assert control over online behaviour and the effect 
of online behaviour on individuals or things.25 Third that there needs to be a new approach towards 
internet governance and policy. That the state on its own can never effectively govern the 
cyberspace and neither can there be no laws at all.   
Proper internet governance can only be achieved by cooperation by all the stakeholders.26 From 
private entities, users, technical bodies and government. Fourth is that open standards – open 
access is what has culminated in the meteoric success of the internet. This is made possible by 
                                                          
24 Lessig L, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyber law Might Teach’, Havard Literature Review (1999), 5.  
25 Johnson D, Post D, ‘Law and Borders- The rise of Law in the Cyberspace’ Stanford Law review (1996), 67.   
26 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in the Cyberspace’ Emory Law Journal (1996), 912.   
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endorsed by trusted standard setting committees. However the evolution of the internet to 
accommodate commerce, the incentives for developing proprietary applications is gradually 
undermining the open-standards model. Technical bodies are therefore in a dilemma where 
adopting certain protocols would benefit or undermine certain private companies. That being said 
technical bodies could be very instrumental in endorsing certain values that governments would 
like to implement such as free speech – with caveats on hate speech, free-trade etc.27  
1.6 Theoretical framework  
Locke’s account of the origins of government and the extent of legislative power in the second 
treatise for the theoretical framework for this paper. According to Locke, humans were initially in 
a state of nature. In this state, men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without asking anyone’s permission subject only 
to limits set by the law of nature.28 This state was inherently unstable and insecure. Individuals 
were constantly under threat of physical harm from each other. It became difficult to pursue any 
goals and endeavours which require stability, peace and cooperation among human beings. It is in 
this context that government arose. Locke’s state of nature is contrasted with cyberspace’s state of 
nature. They are similar in that despite not having a political power in the form of government, 
there is still some underlying ‘law’ that determines how things are ordered and coordinated. Laws 
made need to therefore acknowledge and this existing design in the cyberspace.   
In exercising their legislative power governments’ should confine themselves to conduct that 
would be prejudicial to the society’s safety, order, and morality.29 As such any conduct within the 
cyberspace that only affects the individual in his personal capacity should not be subject to political 
power. In as much as individuals relinquished some of their rights to a political power, it was so 
                                                          
27 Weisner P, ‘Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation’ Northern Kentucky Law Review (2001), 
358.   
28 Locke J, Second Treatise of Government 1689, Early Modern Texts, 2008, 3. Limits of the law of nature alludes to 
the idea that we are all equal and no one would be justified to wilfully cause harm to another human being. However 
should anyone violate this law, then everybody in the state of nature would have a right punish the offender in order 
to prevent further violations.   
29 Article 50(9), 66, Constitution of Kenya 2010.  
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that they are able their lives, liberty and fortunes. Any departure from this is an affront to the 
purpose for which government is established. 30  
It also borrows from Epstein that enacting more laws and regulation may not offer answers or 
solution to all social or economic problems.31 This is true both in the physical world as well as in 
the cyberspace, however within the cyberspace the complexities are even more since the 
underlying system of how things operate is established by engineering.31 As such, there may be 
something to gain by reducing the scope of law32 and allowing all the stakeholders to come up 
with solutions to various problems arising in the cyberspace.33  
1.7 Hypothesis   
This paper proceeds on the assumption that any effective policy on internet regulation needs to 
acknowledge the architecture of the cyberspace which by design is through code. Since code is not 
immutable, it can be altered to reflect certain desired values and laws. Effective regulation of the 
cyberspace will arise from a combination of effective laws, a constitution of values and stakeholder 




                                                          
30 Locke J, Second Treatise on Government 1689, 44. This is especially clear in Media Law as regards classification 
of film. Where the classification board role is to categorize forms of broadcasts. However recently it has gone on to 
stretch its mandate; acting as content regulator and moral police by banning certain broadcasts. While its role is to 
guide citizens on which material is suitable for them, they cannot then make that decision for them.  31 Epstein R, 
Simple rules for a complex world, Havard University Press, 1995, 17  
31 Solum L, ‘The layers principle: Internet architecture and the law’, 815.  
32 Epstein R, Simple rules for a complex world,  https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/simple-rules-for-
ahttps://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/simple-rules-for-a-complex-world-by-richard-
a-epstein/complex-world-by-richard-a-epstein/ on 6 December 2016.  
33 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’ 45 Emory Law Journal (1996), 912.   
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1.8 Research methodology  
This research was carried out using the following methods, library research, internet searches, as 
well as interviews with key informants.  Such as; 
Professor Nii Quaynor is a scientist and engineer who has played an important role in the 
introduction and development of the internet in Africa. He is a member of the ITU Telecom Board, 
Chair of the OAU Internet Taskforce and President of the Internet Society of Ghana.  
Michael Murungi is Google’s East Africa Policy and Government Relations Manager. Before 
joining Google, he was the CEO of the National Council for Law reporting. He has held several 
talks in Strathmore Law School on Internet Governance and policy emphasizing on the importance 
of stakeholder participation.   
The Library and internet searches will consist of strategies pursued by various states in with regard 
to cybercrime. This research will also involve reports, journal articles, and newspaper articles on 
emerging trends within the cyberspace and scholarly opinion on how challenges may be effectively 
dealt with.  
Interviews will be conducted with key scholars within the industry with a view to develop 
understanding the phenomenon and finding solutions to emerging issues within the parameters of 











CHAPTER TWO  
Theoretical Framework  
2.0 Introduction  
This paper attempts to chart a course for governance in the cyberspace. To do this it becomes 
necessary to interrogate the origins and theories that inform various systems of governance. In 
doing this the paper borrows from Locke’s state of nature in a bid to come with a guide to 
formulating laws and governance in the cyberspace. The theory departs from the origins of 
government in the state of nature which came from a poor quality of life which motivated people 
to relinquish some of their rights to a central authority who would protect them but only to the 
extent to which they permit. It particularly hinges on the idea that in as much that there was no 
defined government in the state of nature there was still some sort of law and this is the same for 
the cyberspace. The cyberspace is not lawless and its architecture by design acts as some kind 
regulation which can be tweaked depending on market forces or social norms if it is desirable.   
Nozick and Mill’s propositions on government: that it exists so that people are free to define the 
good life for themselves and to restrict only behaviour that would be prejudicial to society form 
the basis on how legislative power should be exercised.   
This chapter also stresses on the importance of participation of all stakeholders in coming up 
with solutions for problems that arise within the cyberspace. This is important first because the 
pace of law-making will never be as first as evolution and innovation in the cyberspace. 
Secondly because laws may not always provide the most compelling solutions to challenges that 
arise.   
These ideas altogether form the foundation for further exploring how internet regulatory policies 
should be formulated. Subsequent chapters will keep referring back to these central ideas and 





2.1 Origin of Government  
In the Second Treatise, Locke offers an account of the origin of government which was a departure 
from Filmer who posited that humans had always been subject to a political power.34 According 
to Locke, humans were initially in a state of nature. In this state, men are perfectly free to order 
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without asking 
anyone’s permission—subject only to limits set by the law of nature.35 This state was inherently 
unstable and insecure. Individuals were constantly under threat of physical harm from each other. 
It became difficult to pursue any goals and endeavours which require stability, peace and 
cooperation among human beings. It is in this context that government arose. Men saw that it was 
important to relinquish some of their rights to a central authority in exchange for a guarantee of 
safety and security of their person their property and interactions with other men in a stable 
environment.36 This is the source of political power.37 Political Power being the right to make laws 
for enforcement of punishment, regulating and preserving property and to employ the force of the 
community in enforcing the laws for the public good.38  
Locke thereby draws a distinction between law and government. That even before men 
relinquished their rights in contract to a central entity and establish Government, there was still a 
system of law in existence. That there being a state of ‘liberty’ did not mean that it was a state of 
‘license’ where there are no constraints on how people behave.40 Men were still governed by law 
although it did not come from a political source – natural law. Consequently, Aquinas affirms 
that any positive laws that are made derive from natural law as their foundation.41  
                                                          
34Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/#SH4a on 7  December 2016, Robert Filmer 
argued that the monarchy acquired the power to rule and exercised dominion of the rest of the people from God 
through Abraham, and that this power had been passed in an unbroken chain through the ages. The Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) scholarly publication. 
35 Locke J, Second Treatise of Government 1689, Early Modern Texts, 2008, 3. Limits of the law of nature alludes to 
the idea that we are all equal and no one would be justified to willfully cause harm to another human being. However 
should anyone violate this law, then everybody in the state of nature would have a right punish the offender in order 
to prevent further violations.  
36 See IEP http://www.iep.utm.edu/locke/#SH4a on 6 December 2016. 
37 Locke, Second treatise of government 1689, 2-4.  
38 Locke, Second treatise of government 1689, 2. 
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In looking for a governance system for the cyberspace Locke’s theory becomes crucial. His 
distinction between law and government is particularly pivotal. The absence of a political power-
government does not mean that it is a lawless place. The cyberspace has a particular ‘state of 
nature’. A state of nature here means that there is a particular way in which the cyberspace is 
ordered. The internet architecture layers principle and several protocols is system that arises due 
to the nature of how the internet was created just as the state of nature arises due to how beings 
have been created.39   
Locke’s state of nature and the cyberspace’s state of nature are similar in that despite not having a 
political power in the form of government, there is still some underlying ‘law’ that determines how 
things are ordered and coordinated. However, a form of government is needed to regulate human 
behaviour within both environments. Failure to which it will become unstable and insecure for the 
people in it.40 This is what justifies governments’ involvement in the governance of the cyberspace. 
Some spheres believe that governments have no authority to make laws and policies within the 
cyberspace alleging that the internet can regulate itself and through some invisible hand41 rectify 
any problems that arise.42   
Both the cyberspace and the physical space are similar in that they can both be modified by human 
activity, there is however a striking difference in the cyberspace because its fundamental nature is 
shaped by engineering.43 How the Internet runs or cyberspace operates is completely dependent 
on the code that implements it. As such any form of regulation by government should respect this 
or risk being ineffective.   
 
 
                                                          
39 Solum L, ‘The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law’ 4 Notre Dame Law review 1, (2004), 815.  
40 Locke, Second treatise of government 1689, 7.  
41 Smith A, The Wealth of Nations, MetaLibri, Lausanne, 2007, 349.   
42 Barlow J, A Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace, 5. Cyber libertarianism purporting to lock any kind 
of government intervention is completely untenable. For the same reason that Locke gives that: It is unreasonable for 
men to be judges in their own cases.   
43 Solum L, ‘The layers principle: Internet architecture and the law’, 827.  
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state of ‘license’ where there are no constraints on how people behave.44 Men were still governed 
by law although it did not come from a political source – Natural Law. Consequently, Aquinas 
affirms that any positive laws that are made derive from natural law as their foundation.45 
In looking for a governance system for the cyberspace Locke’s theory becomes crucial. His 
distinction between law and government is particularly pivotal. The absence of a political power- 
government does not mean that it is a lawless place. The cyberspace has a particular ‘state of 
nature’. A state of nature here means that there is a particular way in which the cyberspace is 
ordered. The internet architecture layers principle and several protocols is system that arises due 
to the nature of how the internet was created just as the state of nature arises due to how beings 
have been created.46  
Locke’s state of Nature and the cyberspace’s state of nature are similar in that despite not having 
a political power in the form of government, there is still some underlying ‘law’ that determines 
how things are ordered and coordinated. However a form of government is needed to regulate 
human behaviour within both environments. Failure to which it will become unstable and insecure 
for the people in it.47 This is what justifies governments’ involvement in the governance of the 
cyberspace. Some spheres believe that governments have no authority to make laws and policies 
within the cyberspace alleging that the internet can regulate itself and through some invisible 
hand48 rectify any problems that arise.49  
Both the cyberspace and the physical space are similar in that they can both be modified by human 
activity, there is however a striking difference in the cyberspace because its fundamental nature is 
shaped by engineering.50 How the Internet runs or cyberspace operates is completely dependent 
                                                          
44  See IEP http://www.iep.utm.edu/libertar/ on 6 December 2016. 
45 Aquinas T, Summa Theologica Question 95, Article 2.  
46 Solum L, ‘The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law’ 4 Notre Dame Law review 1, (2004), 815. 
47 Locke, Second treatise of government 1689, 7. 
48 Smith A, The Wealth of Nations, MetaLibri, Lausanne, 2007, 349.  
49 Barlow J, A Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace, 5. Cyber libertarianism purporting to lock any kind 
of government intervention is completely untenable. For the same reason that Locke gives that: It is unreasonable for 
men to be judges in their own cases.  
50 Solum L, ‘The layers principle: Internet architecture and the law’, 827. 
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on the code that implements it. As such any form of regulation by government should respect this 
or risk being ineffective.  
Governments should not expect to achieve any worthwhile regulation by just imposing legislation 
that does not take into consideration these special conditions.  
On its own the internet is built perfectly such that it would not need any external forms of 
regulation. It is the human interactions that take place in the cyberspace that make governments’ 
intervention necessary.  
Understanding the various principles underlying the internet’s architecture, (layers Principle, and 
its corollary principles) together with legal, political and ideological theories that inform 
governance, should create a theory of Internet regulation policy.51 This theory should inform any 
sort of legislation adopted by states. Such that even when new functionalities and innovations on 
the internet are developed, the underlying theory can be varied to capture any new ‘regulatory 
gaps’ that may arise.  
 
2.2 The Extent of Legislative Power 
The government and by extension state exists to provide the appropriate conditions for the 
individuals to define the good life for themselves just as long as they do not impede the ability of 
others to do the same.52 As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests 
of others, the state has jurisdiction over it. The question that arises for discussion is whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it. However, when a person’s 
conduct does not affect any persons interests other than his own, there is no room for such 
intervention.53 
In exercising their legislative power governments should confine themselves to conduct that would 
be prejudicial to the society’s safety, order, and morality.54 As such any conduct within the 
                                                          
51 Solum L, ‘The layers principle: Internet architecture and the law’ ,851 
52 Nozick R, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell publishers, 1974, 26, http://www.iep.utm.edu/noz-poli/ on 6 
December 2016. 
53 Mill J, On Liberty 1859, Batoche Books (2001), 69. 
54 Article 50(9), 66(1), Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
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cyberspace that only affects the individual in his personal capacity should not be subject to political 
power. In as much as individuals relinquished some of their rights to a political power, it was so 
that they are able their lives, liberty and fortunes. Any departure from this is an affront to the 
purpose for which government is established. 55 
It is also important to be cognizant of the fact that enacting more laws and regulation may not offer 
answers or solution to all social or economic problems.56 This is true both in the physical world as 
well as in the cyberspace, however within the cyberspace the complexities are even more since the 
underlying system of how things operate is established by engineering.57 As such, there may be 
something to gain by reducing the scope of law58 and allowing all the stakeholders to come up 
with solutions to various problems arising in the cyberspace.59 
Internet governance, if taken as an as the investigation of the regulation of all activities when they 
took place on (or were significantly affected by) the Internet, then ‘Internet governance’ would be 
more or less equivalent to ‘law and politics’. This approach is too broad and ill-defined to be useful. 
As such it is important to distinguish internet governance from two perspectives.60 The first is 
internet governance as ordering of whatever technical systems enable the operation of the global 
network of networks as a platform for applications. It is regulation of Internet infrastructure, its 
current operation, and the processes by which it develops and changes over time. This is done by 
various international agencies; Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers  (ICANN), Internet Telecommunication Union, (ITU), Internet 
                                                          
55 Locke J, Second Treatise on Government 1689, 44. This is especially clear in media law as regards classification of 
film. Where the classification board role is to categorize forms of broadcasts. However recently it has gone on to 
stretch its mandate; acting as a content regulator and moral police by banning certain broadcasts. While its role is to 
guide citizens on which material is suitable for them, they cannot then make that decision for them.  
56 Epstein R, Simple rules for a complex world, Havard University Press, 1995, 17 
57 Solum L, ‘The Layers Principle: Internet architecture and the law’, 815. 
58 Epstein R, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/simple-rules-for-a-complex-world-by-richard-a-
epstein/ on 6 December 2016. 
59 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’ 45 Emory Law Journal (1996), 912.  
60 Solum L, ‘Models of internet governance’ Social Science Research Network (2008), 50-51. 
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Governance Forum  (IGF) etc.61 This regulation is well established and matters most only to 
network engineers. What matters then is the regulation of human activities and behaviour within 
the cyberspace. As such formulation of any regulatory policies needs to focus on the relationship 
between the technical infrastructure, internet architecture and broad policy considerations.62  
This Chapter has discussed the relation between law and government. That law precedes 
government and government exists to preserve liberty. This discussion therefore sets the stage for 
the discourse on how to achieve good governance through sound regulatory policies on the 
internet. This entails examining the existing legal framework of regulation in light of these 











                                                          
61 Internet Engineering Task Force, ‘About Us’ https://www.ietf.org/ Internet Engineering Taskforce, 
https://www.icann.org/ Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 
http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx Internet Telecommunication Union, 
http://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/ Internet Governance Forum  on 16 December 2016. 




The Challenge of Legislating Civil and Moral Wrongs in the Cyberspace 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The problem this paper seeks to address is governance of the cyberspace. The challenge of control 
and enforcement of civil and moral wrongs within the cyberspace stems from the very nature of 
the global information infrastructure.63  Cyberspace and Global Information Infrastructure (“GII”) 
shall be used simultaneously in this paper to refer to the non-physical complex environment 
resulting from the interaction of people, software and services over the internet by the means of 
technology devices and networks.64 Contrary to popular belief the Global Information 
Infrastructure is not a lawless place; there are protocols and systems embedded in the networks 
and devices that control and determine how people interact with each other in the cyberspace.65 
For example network and device logins, network protocols, code, etc.66(Refer to chapter 2 above) 
These determine who can access certain material, what you can and cannot do with your device, 
code in the Youtube application for example has enabled policing of copyright infringement.  
The global network environment defies traditional regulatory theories and policymaking practices. 
This is evidenced by disintegrating concepts of territory and sovereignty, ambiguous substantive 
borders, powerful network communities67 and visible network boundaries (these will be discussed 
below). Yet most attempts at developing new rules for the cyberspace fail to take into account 
these essential features.68 This poses a fundamental challenge for effective leadership and 
governance. Due to the fact that laws and regulation can and do affect infrastructure development, 
                                                          
63 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’ 45 Emory Law Journal, (1996) 912.  
64 Serianu, Rethinking cyber security- An integrated approach: process, intelligence and monitoring, (2014), Kenya 
Cyber Security Report, 9. 
65 Lessig L, Code 2.0 (2006), 5.  
66 Lessig L, Modalities of regulation, 1999, 1- Code is Law. 
67 Johnson D, Post D, ‘Law and borders, The rise of law in cyberspace’, Stanford Law Review (1996),  4. 




innovation and behaviour of GII participants, it is crucial to get it right so that the societal values 
are respected and adhered to.69 
 
3.1 Features of the Cyberspace/ Global Information Infrastructure. 
The features of the cyberspace that pose a challenge to governance stem from the disintegration of 
traditional sovereignty paradigms and emergence of network sovereignty.70 Legal rules are 
generally made to govern distinct subject areas for defined territories.71 These substantive areas 
and territorial sovereignty are what justify the regulatory authority and policymaking for states. 
Criminal law, administrative law belongs to the realm of public law, intellectual property rights 
protect certain aspects of information and its economic value. These laws are enforced by the 
relevant regulatory agencies in corresponding territories. The GII is designed so that persons from 
different geographical locations are able to interact under one roof, without the physical inhibitions 
of space and time these interactions range from contract, social media, publishing content, 




3.2 Disintegration of Traditional National Borders 
 
        3.2.1 Permeable National Borders 
The cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) 
phenomena and physical location.74 Regulatory powers have always been defined by national 
                                                          
69 Lessig L, Code 2.0 (2006), 5. 
70  Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’, 913, 917. 
71 American Banana Company v United Fruit Company (1909) 213US page 347and 357. (Holding that as a general 
rule of construction, any statute is presumed to be intended to operate within the territorial limits of the sovereign). 
72Johnson D, Post D, ‘Law and borders, The rise of law in cyberspace’, 1. 
73 Reidenberg J, ‘Multimedia as a new challenge and opportunity in privacy: The examples of sound and image 
processing’, 22 Materialien zum Datenschutz 9, (1995) 9.   
74 Johnson D, Post D, ‘Law and borders, The rise of law in cyberspace’ 2. 
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borders, however transnational information flows on the GII undermine the capacity of national 
governments to exercise control of legally significant transactions.  
This can be illustrated by the following scenario; a website with DNS registered territorially (.ke, 
.za, .uk) or one that can be anywhere in the world (.com) maliciously orchestrates a scheme to 
solicit confidential information from citizens by scripting/hijacking75 a legitimate government site 
and using that information to defraud unsuspecting citizens, it would be nearly impossible to hold 
any person accountable. 
First, a website registered in a particular country is bound by the particular laws of that regardless 
of the fact that the domain name may be used and accessed by different individuals in different 
geographical reaches. This is especially complicated by the fact that web hosting servers maybe in 
yet another country. Therefore even after justifying to the registering country why you should hold 
the owner of that domain name responsible, you would still have to go to yet another country to 
get evidence from the web hosting servers and most countries are not hospitable to such requests 
as it would expose them to potential cyber risks latent in such access.  
Secondly, even if the offending device was to be found within the territorial limits of that state, it 
would be difficult to show that the person who was found with it was the perpetrator. This is 
because one can simply argue that they did not do; as multiple persons may have had access and 
in order to get proof of that enforcement agencies have to get warrants to get information from 
service providers raising issues of privacy and data protection76 which providers are not willing to 
disclose and courts are uncertain about ruling on them.77 
Hence a situation in which prima facie involved fraud, other issues dealing with other substantive 
laws such as privacy, data protection and property become prominent and need to be addressed. 
The predominant question being whose law applies, which governmental agencies should 
prosecute the offender; the victim of the crime or the state in which the domain is registered and 
the perpetrator resides. Even if one was to solve these issues how are they to be enforced within 
                                                          
75 Open Web Application Security Project: Cross-site Scripting https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-
site_Scripting_(XSS) on 17 November 2016. 
76 Cohen J, ‘Examined lives: Informational privacy and the subject as object’, 52 Stanford Law Review 1373 (2000), 
571. 
77 United States v Morris, Court of Appeal, Judgement on 7 March 1991, 11.  
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the cyberspace where there already exists code and system of running things and network 
communities which have replaced the physical proximate ones.78 
         3.2.2 Ambiguous substantive borders 
This has been alluded to in the previous paragraph whereby governance has historically relied on 
distinctions and borders in substantive law. Intellectual property has been distinct from privacy 
just a telecommunications law is distinct from financial services law. The GII blurs substantive 
borders and the corresponding rights get jumbled up. A classic example today is how network 
service providers such as Safaricom which is a telecommunication company provides financial 
services such as payment, savings and loans which traditionally are within banks purview and 
banks such as equity offering platforms similar to network service providers – Equitel. It is also 
evidenced in how cable companies such as Zuku offer voice communication over and above the 
cable services. All this has been enabled by packet-data switching. However, the effect has been 
to undercut the well-defined borders of communication law.  
Processing instructions can, for example, be embedded in a semiconductor chip to benefit from sui 
generis legal protection, stored on a floppy disk to be covered under copyright, or incorporated in 
a device to obtain patent protection.79 This substantive blurring of rights creates significant 
uncertainty; the degree and scope of protection become variable.80 
Another effect of blurring of the substantive borders is that, objectives of one body of law such as 
privacy can be achieved by application of another field of law rules such as intellectual property. 
 
 3.3 Emergence of Network Sovereignty 
 
The network’s architecture together with network service providers establish rules of participation 
in the cyberspace. These rules create visible borders within the cyberspace and the network 
communities acquire certain sovereign powers.  
                                                          
78 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’, 914.   
79 Ginsburg J, ‘The cyberian captivity of copyright: Territoriality and authors’ rights in a networked world’ 15 Santa 
Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal 347 (1999), 124.  
80 Reidenberg J, ‘Governing networks and rule-making in cyberspace’915. 
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          3.3.1 Visible network borders 
The presence of various network providers within any geographical area establishes a kind of 
boundary such that if you belong in Safaricom your access and activities in the GII are through the 
Safaricom network- not Airtel, MTN, or Verizon. These different service providers avail to their 
users’ particular services and pricing options. Before proliferation of mobile money Safaricom was 
the only provider offering financial services within its network, hence you could only use this 
service if you belonged to the Safaricom network. While doing this the providers essentially 
determines what you can do over the network. An example is that before you can access the 
network you have to register the line(simcard) using a national identity card, to access the payment 
service you have to  activate the account and setup a password, withdrawal has to be done through 
certified agents and so on. Therefore these networks setup borders and rules of engagement and as 
a result are able to police activities over the network acquiring some sovereign powers.  
Technical standards set default boundary rules in the network that tend to empower selected 
participants. Web applications are capable of storing history and cache temporarily. This enables 
one to easily access frequented sites and to keep track of sites visited on a site. This is especially 
important for child safety. Further still these applications such as Google, Instagram, Youtube and 
Facebook have found ways to leverage this information gathered from the users to companies for 
advertisement on their platforms essentially commercializing information volunteered by users.  
Technical standards may be market driven or set by a standards body. An example of a market 
driven standard is the QWERTY keyboard. As soon as they became popular, it became a standard 
and all keyboards are manufactured this way81. Technical standards set by a standards body seek 
to identify and recommend technical specifications for particular network needs such as security.  
3.3.2 Powerful Network Communities  
In addition to the new "geography" of borders, networks may now even supplant substantive, 
national regulation with their own rules of citizenship and participation. Networks themselves take 
on political characteristics as self-governing entities. They determine the rules and conditions of 
                                                          
81 International Standards, Conformity, Assessment, and U.S, Trade Policy Project Committee, Standards 
Conformity Assesment, and Trade into the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington D.C, 1995, 24 
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membership. Private contracts mediate the rights and responsibilities of participants. Service 
providers offer different terms of adherence.  
Networks also determine the rules of participant behaviour. This characteristic can result in rules 
that reverse established territorial laws.82 An example is when Google Books was starting up they 
went all round the big libraries in attempt to secure publications on their platform. This activity 
was seen as an infringement of copyright holders’ rights to adapt, distribute and reproduce their 
work and receive benefits from it. 83 
Like nation-states, network communities have significant powers to enforce rules of participant 
conduct. Service providers may terminate access for offending participants, applications have 
instituted self-policing mechanisms whereby one can report offensive and inappropriate content 
from users (this is prevalent in social media sites).84 The network can also be able to block spam 
and pop up advertisements which are unsolicited. 
States are identified by territory, government, population and laws and enforcement institutions.85 
As discussed above the cyberspace contains certain parameters and one knows the moment they 
have entered it, there is a system of regulation through the architecture, code and technical 
standards, and the network communities are contrasted to governments since they have the power 
to make rules and policies & enforce them on their users. Therefore any new rules promulgated 
should acknowledge that there is already a system, infrastructure and order in the cyberspace and 
using traditional governance theories will be futile. Instead of foundering on old concepts, the GII 
requires a new paradigm for governance that recognises the complexity of networks, builds 
constructive relationships among the various participants (including governments, systems 
                                                          
82 National Research Council, Rights and responsibilities of participants in networked communities, The National 
Academies Press, 1994, Chapter 2 http://iimk.ac.in/gsdl/cgi-bin/library?e=d-000-00---0ecomme--00-0-0--0prompt-
10---4------0-1l--1-en-50---20-about---00031-001-1-0utfZz-8-
00&a=d&cl=CL1&d=HASH01470e354abbaed6735e60f1.4  eBook  on 27 January 2017. 
83 Authors Guild v Google, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2015. 
84 Australia Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) https://www.acorn.gov.au/protect-and-prevent/social-
media on 27 January 2017 
85 Article 1, Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State, (1933). 
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operators, information providers, and citizens), and promotes incentives for the attainment of 
various public policy objectives in the private sector.  
3.4 Cyber Libertarianism and Cyber Paternalism/collectivism  
The emergence of network sovereignty, has led to divergent schools of thought as regards 
governance of the GII, the most prominent schools being cyber libertarianism and paternalism.  
The Cyber Libertarianism school posits that individuals acting in whatever capacity they choose 
(as citizens, consumers, companies, or collectives) should be at liberty to pursue their own tastes 
and interests online.86 It rejects any form of control by established governments and maintains that 
network freedom is freedom from state action which reorders its affairs to supposedly make certain 
people or groups better off or to improve some amorphous “public interest”—an all-to convenient 
facade behind which unaccountable elites can impose their will on the rest of us. 
John Perry Barlow, in his work A Declaration of the Independence of the Cyberspace most 
intelligibly expresses this position:  
‘We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater 
authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we 
are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no 
moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear. 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have neither solicited 
nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. 
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were 
a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our 
collective actions.’87 
Cyber Paternalism/collectivism on the other hand advances the notion that the cyberspace would 
be untenable if no form of regulation is observed. It suggests that governance should be undertaken 
collectively with the various stakeholders (users, private corporations, technical experts and the 
                                                          
86 Techliberation https://techliberation.com/2009/08/12/cyber-libertarianism-the-case-for-real-internet-freedom/ 
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87 Barlow J, A Declaration of Independence of the Cyberspace, 1996, Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
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government) all of whom have an interest in ensuring that GII is able to facilitate their different 
goals.  
States have direct interests in the development of an information society. The private sector has a 
crucial role in the creation of the GII. Technologists have a pivotal position for policy choices and 
the GII empowers citizens to establish rules of their own. Policymaking among these different 
interest centers is intertwined. For example, technological choices may frustrate or support state 
interests or citizen goals. Overlapping jurisdiction and the rapid evolution of information 
technology defy the traditional forms of state control.88 
While states cannot take over the control of the cyberspace, what this school suggests is that they 
can influence rule making by the networks. States can provoke the creation of network standards 
this is evident in the Youtube example that was alluded to earlier whereby the application in its 
capacity as an intermediary has mechanisms to detect copyright infringement and must inform the 
offender and authorise takedown of such material. If it fails to do this it may be held liable for 
intellectual property violations by the real world’s enforcement agencies.89 
Larry Lessig one of the proponents of this position, critiques the perceived freedom that cyber 
libertarians identify with by comparing it to post-communist Russia. Where people hastened to 
usher in the new regime of free markets and freedom. But instead one system of tyranny by the 
state was replaced with another run by the Mafiosi.90 Cyberspace libertarians, propound the view 
that the market-driven forces shall guide activities by some sort of invisible hand. which in post-
communist Russia failed.  
Lessig instead suggest Liberty in cyberspace will not come from the absence of the state. Liberty 
there, as anywhere, will come from a state of a certain kind. Liberty is built by setting society on 
a kind of constitution. By constitution he means an architecture and not just a legal text that 
structures and constrains social and legal power, to the end of protecting fundamental values. He 
compares it to the Bill of Rights that affirm the values that are held dear by society which are 
critical to ensuring that powers held by the state is checked to ensure all peoples well-being. 
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This chapter outlines various challenges of cyber regulation. These range from disintegration of 
traditional borders both territorially and in the substance of laws, as well as emergence of network 
sovereignty- this refers to actors outside of government who control key aspects of the 
communication and information infrastructure which governments would ordinarily handle. It 
therefore follows that enactment of laws should be aimed at clarifying how these inherent 
challenges should be resolved and not compound them at the very least. The following chapters 
look at the legal framework for cyberspace regulation in order to determine their efficacy in 




International Legal Framework 
4.0 Introduction 
It is curious, that regulation on cybercrime and security began at the international level.91 The 
advent of the internet made interaction across the globe in real-time workable.92 This interaction 
is at all spheres of life: social, economic and political. This shift presented a regulatory nightmare 
for states as their reach in many interactions was restricted due to the fact that they transcended 
their borders, touched on various substantive aspects of law and because the rules of engagement 
within the cyberspace differed significantly from those of the physical world.  
The Council of Europe formulated the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime with the intention of 
harmonising international laws in order to pursue a common agenda to combat cybercrime.93 
However what has emerged is that states are taking the Convention as a guideline and tailoring 
their own statutes in accordance with their own goals and challenges they experience. 
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 It is important to note that inasmuch as the cybercrime phenomena is universally shared, it 
manifests itself differently and uniquely in states.94 For example in Kenya data exfiltration was 
ranked as the top cyber security threat in 2015 – this is mainly by top employees and 
cybercriminals, this is followed by social engineering and database breaches. These threats are to 
the integrity and confidentiality of data.95 As a result, the African Union, regulation- African 
Convention on Cyber security and Data Protection is alive to this reality and this is reflected in its 
provisions targeted to securing the cyberspace for the purposes of development in ecommerce.96 
Whereas in the western world ecommerce is well established and the threats they face are complex 
and more politically motivated such as the Sony Pictures Attack from North Korea as a retaliation 
for creating a movie depicting the assassination of the North Korea leader, the Bowman dam 
infrastructure attack where Iranian hackers reportedly gained control of this New York dam’s 
sluice system in 2013.97 More recently the Russian hack of the Democratic National Convention 
(DNC) and the effect it has on the integrity of the US 2016 elections.98 The bottom-line here is 
that the nature of the cyberspace and interactions upon it necessitated an international approach to 
regulation. Seeing as it is impossible to regulate criminal behaviour without a means to ensure 
enforcement of sanctions, international cooperation remains central to facilitating such 
enforcement.99 
The following two Chapters will discuss the legal framework at the international regional & 
national levels. It will seek to examine whether the challenges in chapter three to regulation have 
been adequately taken care of. It will also interrogate two aspects of regulation in an attempt to 
come up with an effective theory for internet regulatory policy. The first aspect is how to formulate 
effective cyber laws. This will be done by looking at various strategies undertaken by various 
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states both in the developing and developed world. The merits and demerits of both sides will be 
discussed with an aim of coming up with an effective guide for formulating cyber laws.  
The second aspect is founded on the assertion that liberty in cyberspace will not come from the 
absence of the state. Liberty there, as anywhere, will come from a state of a certain kind. ‘We build 
a world where freedom can flourish not by removing from society any self-conscious control, but 
by setting it in a place where a particular kind of self-conscious control survives.’100 Liberty in the 
cyberspace shall therefore be achieved by setting the society on a certain Constitution. A 
constitution here means an architecture that structures and constrains social and legal power, to the 
end of protecting fundamental values. Just constitutions guarantee fundamental values in the form 
of bill of rights (speech, privacy, due process), there needs to be a constitution for the cyberspace 
that enshrines various values that ought to be protected. A commitment to these substantive values 
would remain despite the passing fancies of normal, or ordinary, government.101 The challenge 
here is coming up/ choosing between a set of values such as:102 Will cyberspace promise privacy 
or access? Will it enable a free culture or a permission culture? Will it preserve a space for free 
speech? Once a set of values is agreed upon then code can be used to implement since the 
architecture of the cyberspace is based upon it. We can build, architect, or code cyberspace to 
protect values that we believe are fundamental. Or we can build, architect, or code cyberspace to 
allow those values to disappear. 
This chapter finally argues that effective cyber laws need to be complemented by Constitution – a 
set of values that underpin interactions on the cyberspace. It’s only when both of these aspects are 
together that there’ll be adequate regulation. After a Constitution is agreed upon then these values 
can be implemented in the cyberspace through code. The technical standard setting bodies are 
critical to this process. Just as they were able to endorse standards during the development of the 
internet they can then implement a Constitution through code. This would ensure that laws are 
complemented and better enforcement is affected.  
                                                          
100 Lessig L, Code 2.0,2006, 4.  
101 Wendell H, ’The Path of the Law’ 10 Harvard Law Review (1897), 457.  
102 Merritt S, Marx L, Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Cambridge: MIT 








4.1 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime  
The Convention on Cybercrime was adopted in Budapest in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. 
Although the Convention originated from the Council of Europe, 103 it has been ratified by a 
number of non-member states (Australia, Mauritius, Dominican Republic, Israel, Panama, Sri 
Lanka) and observer states (Canada, Japan United States and South Africa).104  
The Budapest Convention is a multilateral agreement geared at facilitating international 
cooperation in the prosecution of cyber criminals.105 It is the first international treaty on crimes 
seeking to address internet and computer crime by harmonising national laws, improving 
investigative techniques, and increasing cooperation among nations.106 It contains provisions on 
infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of network 
security. It also contains a series of powers and procedures such as the search of computer networks 
and interception.107 Its main objective, set out in the preamble, is to pursue a common criminal 
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policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate 
legislation and fostering international co-operation.108  
The treaty consists of four chapters. Chapter I defines terms used by the treaty. Chapter II 
establishes a common cannon of computer-based and computer-related crimes, requiring a 
common set of procedural powers, and loosely establishes a set of rules by which parties can assert 
jurisdiction. Chapter III sets up a framework for cooperation in the use of those powers. Chapter 
IV includes miscellaneous provisions common to most Council of Europe treaties.109 
4.2 Internet Bodies 
These are the bodies that govern the internet’s architecture, technical standards and working 
making possible all the interactions that subsist presently. These bodies’ work is well established 
and uncontested.110 However, because they are responsible for the internet’s working and nature 
they are crucial in the regulatory framework.111 
 
4.2.1 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
This body develops and promotes voluntary internet standards in particular the standards that 
comprise the Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP). It is an open standards organisation, with no formal 
membership or membership requirements. All participants and managers are volunteers, though 
their work is usually funded by their employers or sponsors.112 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is a large open international community of network 
designers, operators, vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet 
architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet. It is open to any interested individual.  
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The actual technical work of the IETF is done in its working groups, which are organised by topic 
into several areas (e.g., routing, transport, security, etc.). Much of the work is handled via mailing 
lists. The IETF holds meetings three times per year. 
The IETF working groups are grouped into areas, and managed by Area Directors, or ADs. The 
ADs are members of the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Providing architectural 
oversight is the Internet Architecture Board,(IAB). The IAB also adjudicates appeals when 
someone complains that the IESG has failed. The IAB and IESG are chartered by the Internet 
Society (ISOC) for these purposes. The General Area Director also serves as the chair of the IESG 
and of the IETF, and is an ex-officio member of the IAB.113 
 4.2.2 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
ICANN was formed in 1998. It is a not-for-profit partnership of people from all over the world 
dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. It promotes competition and 
develops policy on the Internet’s unique identifiers.114 
To reach another person on the Internet you have to type an address into your computer - a name 
or a number. That address has to be unique so computers know where to find each 
other. ICANN coordinates these unique identifiers across the world. Without that coordination we 
wouldn't have one global Internet. 
ICANN does not control content on the Internet. It cannot stop spam and  does not deal with access 
to the Internet. But through its coordination role of the Internet’s naming system, it does have an 
important impact on the expansion and evolution of the Internet. 
4.2.3 Internet Governance Forum (IGF)  
IGF is a multi-stakeholder forum for policy dialogue on issues of internet governance. It brings 
together all stakeholders in the Internet governance debate, whether they represent governments, 
the private sector or civil society, including the technical and academic community, on an equal 
basis and through an open and inclusive process.115 The establishment of the IGF was formally 
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announced by the United Nations Secretary-General in July 2006. It was first convened in 
October–November 2006 and has held an annual meeting since then. 
 
4.2.4 Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)  
The IRTF promotes research of importance to the evolution of the Internet by creating focused, 
long-term research groups working on topics related to Internet protocols, applications, 
architecture and technology.  
 Research groups have the stable long term membership needed to promote the development of 
research collaboration and teamwork in exploring research issues. Participation is by individual 
contributors, rather than by representatives of organisations.116 
4.3 Formulating Effective Cyber laws 
Chapter Three discusses the challenges that regulating the cyberspace has faced. It is therefore a 
laudable effort on the part of Council of Europe for formulating the Convention on Cybercrime. It 
was a step in the right direction as it contains comprehensive provisions not only substantively but 
also procedurally stressing on cooperation, information sharing and the handling of digital 
evidence. It however falls short on the part of protecting privacy and enhancing innovation.117 As 
such it infringes on certain liberties of persons in the cyberspace. The delicate part of regulation is 
balancing the interests of law enforcement whilst ensuring that certain liberties are protected. 
Lessig’s idea on having Constitution that enshrines these values and provides instances where they 
may be limited becomes a prudent solution to this dilemma.118      
It is also ironic that despite the central role the internet’s architecture has on any pursuit of 
regulation, there has been no attempt to consult with the technical internet bodies who set standards 
that facilitate the working of the internet. The involvement of technical bodies would be 
particularly insightful if adequate regulation is to be affected particularly because they have 
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experience in how it works and also because they can effect changes in the infrastructure in order 
to reflect the spirit of the law.    
Laws on the cyberspace have been led by governments. Even the Council of Europe is 
conglomerate of European countries. It is more likely than not that the process will be politically 
motivated or the outcome is such that a large part of the international community is excluded. This 
is clearly evidenced by the fact that even though it is hailed as an international convention the 
parties are Council of Europe countries US, Canada, Japan, Australia, Israel, Mauritius, and 
Panama. A total of 50 countries. If cybercrime and security is a universal concern how come then 
only a quarter of the countries have agreed to come together to address it? Law-making therefore 
needs to go beyond just governments and seek input from all other stakeholders. 
Since the cyberspace cuts across territories and covers all people in the world, it is not unreasonable 
to expect that there are common set values that all persons are expected upheld and protected. 
Therefore for there to be any truly international undertaking these values need to be well 
established and settled. This can be compared to certain disciplines such as international 
environmental law where there are generally agreed principles such as sustainable development, 
generational equity, prevention and precaution. This is the same approach that regulation in the 
cyberspace should take. These principle are not to come from government but from a combined 
effort from industry, academia, governmental organization and as well as the users. As was the 
case with Rio, Stockholm and Nairobi conventions.119 
The following section discusses strategies undertaken by Canada to preserve and protect cyber 
security. This is in order to chart a path on how governments’ should formulate policies in order 






                                                          




Regional and National Legal Framework 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses the importance of having an international system of laws for cyber 
regulation.120The current international system is the convention on cybercrime we however see 
that it is really not as international as it has been hailed with most parties being in Europe and other 
western countries several continents are not represented. South Africa is the only country in Africa 
that has signed the convention.  
The existence of a parallel system of laws is also due to the fact that developed and developing 
countries face varied challenges as was discussed in Chapter Three. Developing countries are faced 
with challenges involving the integrity of data and fraud as regards electronic transactions. Hence 
the African Union legal framework in particular stresses on empowering people to engage in 
electronic transactions confidently and facilitating E-commerce. However, developed countries 
have mass surveillance systems for spying on each other and their own citizens, Hence they have 
more complex threats such as attacks on critical infrastructure as well as politically motivated 
attacks such as the Russian on the DNC and the effects it had on the integrity of the US 2016 
elections. 121  
This chapter interrogates the efficacy of the upcoming regional and national legal frameworks for 
cyberspace regulation. These frameworks are fairly recent. The AU Convention 2014 and Kenya 
cyber security bill has yet to be passed. These divergent systems of laws present a potential 
challenge for law enforcement as they do not provide cooperation and information sharing or 
capacity building and training for both the enforcement agencies as well as the judiciary. This 
Chapter also discusses the experiences of South Africa in adjudicating cyber cases given its 
relatively longer experience compared to other African countries.122 
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5.1 African Union Convention on Cyber security and Data Protection 
The Convention was first drafted in 2011 and was adopted on June 27, 2014 with the last signature 
on January 29, 2016.123 The Convention covers a very wide range of online activities, including 
electronic commerce, data protection, and cybercrime, with a special focus on racism, xenophobia, 
child pornography, and national cyber security.124 Following its passing, many African nations 
have begun the process of enacting personal data protection laws for the first time, upheld by new, 
independent public authorities.  This move represents a huge boon to user control over private 
information. In addition, each state is required to develop a national cyber security strategy, pass 
cybercrime laws, and ensure that e-commerce is “exercised freely.”125  
The Convention establishes a legal framework for cyber-security and personal data protection 
embodying the existing commitments of African Union Member States at sub-regional, regional 
and international levels to build the Information Society.126 It takes into account the requirements 
of respect for the rights of citizens, guaranteed under the fundamental texts of domestic law and 
protected by international human rights conventions and treaties, particularly the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights. This Convention seeks to establish an appropriate normative 
framework consistent with the African legal, cultural, economic and social environment.127 
5.2 The Kenya Cyber security and Protection Bill  
The Kenya Cyber Security and Protection Bill as at January 2017 is still in parliament. It is a Bill 
to provide for the enhancement of security in cyberspace; to provide for the prohibition, 
prevention, detection, response, investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes to establish the 
national cyber security response unit.128 It mainly focusses on the establishment of a National 
Cyber Threat Response Unit that shall be a department within the Ministry responsible for matters 
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relating to information and technology.129 This is directly modelled from the African Union 
Convention on Cyber security and Data Protection. The functions of the Unit shall be to- (a) 
receive reports of interruptions, disruptions or interference with computer systems or networks; 
(b) investigate the interruption, disruption or any other unlawful interference with a computer 
system or network; (c) advise on measures to prevent and combat computer related offences, 
cybercrimes, threats to national cyberspace and other cyber security related matters among other 
things.130  
The Bill also proposes that private entities may enter into information sharing agreements with 
public entities or with each other. It sets certain conditions for such agreements: to ensure cyber 
security; for the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to cyber security; for the protection 
of life or property of an individual; and to protect the national security of the country. This will 
potentially be scandalous as it give government a backdoor to communication infrastructure and 
could infringe on constitutionally protected privacy 131rights.132 There is no provision for who 
determines if a particular situation amounts to what is disclosed under Section 9(2) and for how 
long such information sharing should subsist. Part IV of the Bill goes into detail on offences and 
penalties: Unlawful access to a computer system, System interference, unlawful interceptions, 
interception of electronic messages or money transfers, wilful misdirection of electronic 
messages., forgery, fraud, unauthorised modification of data, cyber terrorism, phishing, cyber 
bullying, child pornography among others.133 
5.3 Canada 
Canada has been traditionally described as a fire-proof house based on its advantageous geographic 
situation, however the globalized nature of cyberspace is eroding this conventional wisdom. The 
Canadian government released a cyber-security strategy in 2010. This strategy is built on three 
pillars: securing government systems, partnering to secure vital cyber systems outside the federal 
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government, and helping Canadians to be secure online. The policy outlines the goals of securing 
Canadian cyberspace as well as a number of specific initiatives.134 
The strategy identifies two approaches to preventing cyber-attacks. The first initiative involves 
reducing the number of access points to government systems, as follows: "The Government will 
enhance the security of its cyber architecture. It will continue to reduce the number of Internet 
gateways into its computer systems, and take other measures to secure systems".135 This measure 
shows that the government recognises the need to centralise access points to its systems so as to 
isolate threats, given the unpredictability and anonymity of an attack. The second measure 
recognises the critical linkages between the individual and the system. Acknowledging the 
important role of its employees, it cites actions like changing passwords regularly and raising cyber 
awareness. The strategy similarly identifies two ways of managing and responding in real time to 
cyber-attacks. Its primary goal is to set out clear federal roles and responsibilities.  
The government is also taking steps to increase intelligence capacity and threat management 
capability: "Communications Security Establishment Canada will enhance its capacity to detect 
and discover threats, provide foreign intelligence and cyber security services, and respond to cyber 
threats and attacks against Government networks and information technology system. The final 
step and set of problems that plague government response to cyber threats have to do with law 
enforcement. This set of issues is clearly identified in the strategy paper as a priority. The strategy 
aims at equipping Canada’s law enforcement agencies investigative powers and tools. Providing 
them with new legislative authorities and supporting financial resources". 136 This prioritization 
reflects a clear understanding on the part of policymakers to one of the central pitfalls of 
government response to the cyber threats. The three aspects of response (prevention, real-time 
response, and law enforcement) are underwritten by a need to partner with the private sector and 
civil society to create a comprehensive framework of response. This underlying cooperative 
imperative is also reflected in the strategy. "The Government will build on existing programs and 
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expertise, such as Defense Research and Development Canada's Public Security Technical 
Program to better support cyber security research and development activities. We will also 
collaborate with our private sector and academic partners to enhance information sharing 
activities.” 
Canada’s cyber security strategy prioritises prevention and security first, especially for 
government systems.137 This by a far a prudent approach as opposed to reacting to attacks and 
situation. Having a prevention and security system cushions and anticipates attacks is something 
that developing countries can incorporate into their legislation. While many developing countries 
such as Kenya are still in the process of building their government systems it is laudable if they 
incorporate these and learn from past experiences in order to avoid pitfalls. The Kenya Cyber 
Security bill alludes to this by having a provision for critical Infrastructure.138 It outlines what is 
to be considered critical infrastructure and goes ahead to state that stakeholders of critical 
infrastructure need to keep abreast with security measures and update the respective government 
agency whenever there is an intrusion and the steps they have undertaken to resolve those issues.  
States need to ensure that when formulating policies they also need to equip the law enforcement 
agencies. This ranges from constant training on emerging threats, collecting and presenting digital 
evidence and financially enabling them.  
Canada’s strategy aims at building on existing programs and expertise, such as Defense Research 
and Development Canada's Public Security Technical Program to better support cyber security 
research and development activities. This is something most developing countries are yet to 
emulate. Having programs and expertise from academia, labs and the military will help greatly in 
anticipating risk to the cyberspace and providing adequate responses.  
5.4 South Africa  
The South African government has taken the lead in introducing cyber legislation to address cyber-
crime. The ineffectiveness of the South African common law to combat cybercrime, led to the 
promulgation of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (ECT). 
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Although South Africa has signed the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cyber Crime No. 185 
it has not ratified the treaty. 
Ineffectiveness of the South African common law to combat cybercrime, led to the. Earlier case 
law also illustrated the need for specific legislation to address computer crime. The case of S v 
Mashiyi and Another139 is a case in point where the question of admissibility of computer-
generated documents arose. The court held that in terms of the ‘prevailing law’, it could not admit 
the disputed documents which contained information that has been processed and generated by a 
computer into evidence. 
The main objective of the ECT is ‘to provide for the facilitation and regulation of electronic 
communications and transactions in the public interest’. The ECT deals comprehensively with 
cybercrime in Chapter 13. The following offences are punishable offences under the ECT: sections 
86(4) and 86(3) introduce new forms of crimes called anti-cracking (anti-thwarting) and hacking 
law which prohibit the selling, designing or producing of anti-security circumventing technology; 
e-mail bombing and spamming are addressed in sections 86(5) and 45 of the ECT respectively; 
whereas the crimes of extortion, fraud and forgery are addressed in section 87.140 
The Act has also created ‘cyber-inspectors’ who are authorised to enter premises to obtain 
information regarding cybercrime (in terms of section 82(1)). Cyber inspectors are empowered in 
terms of the ECT to enter any premises and access information that may impact on an investigation 
into cybercrime. However, this provision may infringe sections 14 and 25 of the 1996 Constitution, 
which deal with the right to privacy and right to property respectively.  
There is a dearth of jurisprudence from South African Courts as pertains to economic crimes. In R 
v Douvenga the question was whether an accused employee, Douvenga, was guilty of a 
contravention of section 86(1) of the ETC. The accused intentionally and without permission, 
gained entry to data which she knew was contained in confidential databases and contravened the 
provision by sending this data by e-mail to her fiancé. The accused was found guilty of 
contravening section 86(1) of the ETC. She was sentenced to a fine of R1 000 or imprisonment for 
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a period of three months. This case illustrates that the crime of hacking is entrenched in section 
86(1) of the ETC. Thus any unlawful access and interception of data is regarded as a criminal 
offence.141 
The case of S v Ndiki and Others demonstrates that the South African courts are adopting a 
progressive approach. In this case, the state sought to introduce certain documentary evidence 
consisting of computer-generated print-outs, designated as exhibits D1-D9, during the course of a 
criminal trial. The court found that because certain individuals had signed exhibits D1 to D4, the 
computer had been used as a tool to create the relevant documentation.142Therefore, these 
documents constituted hearsay. Exhibits D5 to D9 had been created without human intervention 
and such evidence constituted real evidence. Therefore, the admissibility of this evidence 
depended on the reliability and accuracy of the computer and its operating systems. The state bore 
the onus of proving such accuracy and reliability. The court’s progressive approach in regarding 
part of the computer-based evidence as real evidence has been lauded by certain academics.143 
 South Africa has signed the CECC but not ratified it. So far, it is the only African country to have 
done so. The treaty contains important provisions to assist law enforcement in its fight against 
trans-border cybercrime. Therefore, South Africa needs to ratify the cybercrime treaty to avoid 
becoming an easy target for international cybercrime. Although substantive obligations are in 
place, South Africa needs to revise some procedural provisions to comply with the treaty such as 
introducing a 24/7 contact center. The establishment of the Computer Security Incident Response 
Team (CSIRT) indicates that a move to tackle cybercrime is gathering.144 
The establishment of organisations such SABRIC to combat cybercrime in the banking industry is 
a positive move.145 SABRIC provides the banking industry with crime risk information 
                                                          
141 District Court of the Northern Transvaal, Pretoria, case no 111/150/2003, 19 August 2003 (unreported case). 
142 S v Ndiki 2008 2 SACR 252. 
143 Cassim F, ‘Addressing the growing spectre of cybercrime in Africa: evaluating measures adopted by South Africa 
and other regional role players’, University of South Africa Institutional Repository, (2011), 127. 
144 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, https://www.csir.co.za/news/2009 on 9 January 2017. 
145 SABRIC was established in 2002 as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Banking Association. Its key stakeholders 
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management services and facilitates inter-bank initiatives to reduce the risk of organised bank-
related crime, through effective public private partnerships. The police are collaborating with 
banks and the IT industry via SABRIC to combat cybercrime and bring cyber criminals to book.146 
It is submitted that the private sector has a vested interest in addressing bank-related crime. Such 
public-private partnerships are necessary in the fight against cybercrime.  
The regional and national framework for cyberspace regulation falls short of the essential aspect 
of cooperation and information sharing which is necessary for enforcement of laws.  
The AU convention is only workable if the signatories enact their own cyber laws and activity 
which is largely government led. What is likely to happen is that states will have different cyber 
laws locally and ultimately it will be difficult to form concerted efforts under the umbrella of the 
AU Convention. As such investigations and enforcement are thwarted by the fact that there is no 
common undertaking to share information and collaborate. 
It is peculiar that there are also no common institutions with a cyber-security agenda for the 
continent. The Kenya Cyber security bill proposes to create a National Cyber Threat Response 
Unit a department within the Ministry responsible for matters relating to information and 
technology. 147 The fact that there are no established institutions and the judiciary has yet to be 
properly inducted to the working of these new technologies in order to properly adjudicate cases 
that may come before them.  
It therefore follows that new regulations should be accompanied by capacity building for all the 
agencies involved. This is both financial and through training. It ensures that laws are 
complemented by institutions that are capable of adequate enforcement. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.0 Conclusion  
Chapter one began by introducing the challenge of regulation in the cyberspace a thereby in present 
the research objective which is to come with a theory for internet regulatory policy. There was 
literature review of the major ideas of this paper justifying the study of cyber law as an independent 
discipline, the cyberspace as a unique nature and code as law. This Then proceeds to the discussion 
on the theoretical framework in Chapter 2.  
Chapter two was an analysis of the origins of government and extent of legislative power by Locke 
and Nozick. This was contrasted with the nature of the cyberspace which though does not have 
government in the political sense still has some underlying law which could be then molded in 
accordance with the challenges that present themselves today. This chapter concludes by stating 
that cyber laws should respect the architecture of the cyberspace which then can be modified 
accordingly. That government cannot presume to take on every foreseeable action against persons 
and legislative authority has its limits.  
Chapter three presents the challenges to formulating effective cyber laws. This chapter also 
analyses the different philosophies of regulation and their merits and demerits. It sets the stage for 
analyzing the existing legal framework and whether they are alive to these challenges to ensure 
effective enforcement. 
Chapter four and five discuss the approaches to be taken towards regulation of the cyberspace. 
This is done by discussing approaches taken by both South Africa and Canada and setting out 
various key things that states need to incorporate in their laws and strategies. It also affirms the 
need of constitution to complement laws. Constitution embodying various settled values would go 
a long way in ensuring effective law enforcement. These two chapters discuss the international 
and regional legal frameworks the shortcomings and successes and the implications they have on 
the development of an internet regulatory policy.  
Chapter Six does a summary of all the chapters and makes recommendations on the way forward 





Even with the most effective legislation one thing remains immutable- the exponential rate of 
evolution in the cyber domain outpaces the speed of legal and judicial processes.148 This is further 
evidenced by the fact that each new defense strategy leads to co -adaptation by a corresponding 
set of attacks.149  
The approach generally taken by most countries is reactionary. This is the point at which law 
enforcement is involved and steps are taken to contain the situation.150 A better strategy would be 
taking steps to prevent attacks by; securing government systems, partnering to secure vital cyber 
systems outside the government, and helping citizens to be secure online. This would be by far be 
more effective and less costly compared to restoring systems post attack.  
Governments can enhance the security of its cyber architecture by reducing the number of access 
points to government systems. This measure shows that the government recognizes the need to 
centralize access points to its systems so as to isolate threats, given the unpredictability and 
anonymity of an attack. 151 
International cooperation remains a cornerstone for enforcement. The first proposition is that 
African countries need to ratify the Budapest Convention on cybercrime as it is the only instrument 
geared at facilitating investigation through cooperation among countries. The ability to carry out 
investigations affecting the territory of other states, so-called ‘investigative jurisdiction’ is 
addressed in Chapter III of the Convention. The Convention does not expressly provide for the 
                                                          
148 Ghanea-Hercock R, ‘Why cyber security is hard’ Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2012), 85. 
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principle of reciprocity,152 but does state that parties are to cooperate with each other ‘to the widest 
extent possible’ in the investigation of cybercrimes and the collection of electronic evidence.153 
This includes the sharing of information without request where it would assist another party in its 
investigation or which it believes might assist the receiving party in the investigation of any 
offence that could lead to a mutual assistance request under the Budapest Convention. 
Although the Convention tacitly permits some cross-border access to stored computer data without 
the need to request mutual assistance, 154 such investigations are only allowed when access to the 
data is publicly available (open source) or when the state conducting the search has obtained "the 
lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the data..155The 
drafters of the Convention on Cybercrime explicitly deny that the treaty permits remote 
exterritorial searches. 
States need to ensure that when formulating policies they also need to equip the law enforcement 
agencies. This ranges from constant training on emerging threats, collecting and presenting digital 
evidence and financially enabling them.  
Canada’s strategy aims at building on existing programs and expertise, such as Defense Research 
and Development Canada's Public Security Technical Program to better support cyber security 
research and development activities. This is something most developing countries are yet to 
emulate. Having programs and expertise from academia, labs and the military will help greatly in 
anticipating risk to the cyberspace and providing adequate responses.  
Since the cyberspace cuts across territories and covers all people in the world, it is not unreasonable 
to expect that there are common set values that all persons are expected upheld and protected.156 
                                                          
152 In contrast, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature 12 
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Therefore for there to be any truly international undertaking these values need to be well 
established and settled. This can be compared to certain disciplines such as International 
Environmental law where there are generally agreed principles such as Sustainable development, 
generational equity, prevention and precaution. This is the same approach that regulation in the 
cyberspace should take. These principle are not to come from government but from a combined 
effort from industry, academia, governmental organization and as well as the user. As was the case 
with Rio, Stockholm and Nairobi conventions.157 
Given the central role the internet’s architecture has on any pursuit of regulation, there has to be 
consultation with the technical internet bodies who set standards that facilitate the working of the 
internet. The involvement of technical bodies would be particularly insightful if adequate 
regulation is to be affected particularly because they have experience in how it works and also 
because they can effect changes in the infrastructure in order to reflect the spirit of the law.    
Proper internet governance can only be achieved by cooperation by all the stakeholders.158 From 
private entities, users, technical bodies and government. Only with the involvement of all these 
agencies can there be effective la enforcement. Government alone, cannot be held responsible for 
formulating solutions in the cyberspace it has to be combined effort.159   
New technologies can also be used to actualize various regulatory goals. Block chain technology 
which emerged during the period of financial crisis in 2008 came about at the exact moment in 
time when people were losing trust in a centralised system of law and order. Block chain’s 
decentralised, open & cryptographic nature allow people to trust each other and transact peer to 
peer, making the need for intermediaries obsolete. This also brings unprecedented security 
benefits.160 Hacking attacks that commonly impact large centralized intermediaries like banks 
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would be virtually impossible to pull off on the block chain. For example — if someone wanted to 
hack into a particular block in a block chain, a hacker would not only need to hack into that specific 
block, but all of the proceeding blocks going back the entire history of that block chain. And they 
would need to do it on every ledger in the network, which could be millions, simultaneously.161 
Such technologies and innovation are only possible when stakeholders agree to make them 
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